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RESUMEN 
En un duopolio experimental simØtrico contrastamos la capacidad de 
las Garant￿as de Precio M￿nimo (GPM) para elevar los precios por 
encima de los competitivos. Las GPM son introducidas como una 
instituci￿n de mercado (el precio efectivo de venta es siempre el 
m￿nimo ofrecido) y como una opci￿n estratØgica, de manera que los 
sujetos deciden si ofrecerlas o no. Nuestros resultados indican que las 
GPM producen un claro resultado colusivo, ya que los mercados 
convergen rÆpida y completamente a la predicci￿n colusiva si las GPM 
son impuestas como una instituci￿n de mercado. Si los sujetos tienen 
la oportunidad de decidir si ofrecer las GPM o no, observamos que 
casi todos los sujetos deciden adoptar las GPM y los precios se 
mantienen muy cerca de los colusivos. 
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ABSTRACT 
In a symmetric differentiated experimental duopoly we test the 
ability of Price Matching Guarantees (PMG) to rise prices above the 
competitive levels.  PMG is introduced both as a market institution 
(the effective selling price is always the lowest posted price) and as a 
strategic choice so subjects have to decide whether or not to offer it. 
Our results show that PMG leads to a clear collusive outcome as 
markets quickly and fully converge to the collusive prediction if PM is 
imposed as a market institution.  If subjects are allowed to decide 
whether to adopt PMG or not we observe that almost all subjects 
decide to adopt PMG and prices get very close to the collusive ones. 
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1.  Introduction 
It is rather common for firms to guarantee their prices by promising to match their 
competitors prices. Price Matching Guarantees (PMG) intend to make customers 
confident that they are being charged the lowest prices; a clear pledge of competitive 
prices1. As Edlin (1997) suggests, "a price matching policy seems the epitome of 
cutthroat competition: what could be more competitive that sellers' guaranteeing their 
low prices by promising to match the prices of any competitor?". 
Despite the competitive nature of these clauses, an extensive economic literature 
starting with Salop (1986) has argued that, contrary to conventional wisdom, PMG 
facilitate tacit collusion for at least two reasons. First, if PMG make firms automatically 
match any price, they act an incentive-management device discouraging price-cutting by 
rival firms. Second, PMG give an incentive for the customer to report competitors' price 
cuts, so they become an exchange information device for firms. 
The empirical analysis on the collusive effect of PMG has been scarce and far from 
conclusive,2 most probably because collusion practices are difficult to investigate, since 
sellers try to hide competition restraining activities from buyers (and antitrust 
authorities). Moreover, actual effects on prices of these practices are difficult to 
empirically isolate and prove. 
The effect of PMG has been analyzed by the theoretical literature.3 The standard 
Bertrand competition between symmetric firms with a differentiated good is intensely 
altered by the introduction of PMG, as a continuum of symmetric and asymmetric 
equilibria emerge. The lack of definite empirical results and the complexity of the 
theoretical setting converts the laboratory on an appropriate ground to test the effect on 
market prices of PMG. To the best of our knowledge, there is no specific experimental 
test of the collusive effects of Price Matching guarantees4. Deck and Wilson (2003) test 
the impact of an assorted variety of LPG and pricing algorithms to find the striking result 
that although PMG might help to increase median prices, subjects tend to elude the use 
of these guarantees. 
                                                           
1 Arbastkaya, Hviid and Shaffer (1999a) survey evidence on patterns of adoption of LPGs. 
2 Hess and Gerstner (1991) found supra competitive prices due to a Price Matching guarantee offered by a 
single supermarket over supermarket price setting; Arbastkaya, Hviid and Shaffer (1999b) and Milyo and 
Waldfogel (1999) found no significant effect on their studies of retail tire prices and alcoholic beverages. 
3 Dixit and Nalebuff (1991) and Sargent (1993) suggest that price-beating guarantees are even more effective 
than PMG at supporting high prices. Corts (1995) argue in the opposite direction. Hviid and Shaffer (1999) 
removes the traditional assumption that it is costless for consumers to activate the guarantee to show that 
even in this case PBG counteract the collusive effect of PMG. 
4  Jain and Srivastava (2000) analyze how consumers view and interpret LPGs to check the effect of LPGs on 
the buyers' quality perception of stores.  2 
In this paper we try to fill this gap analyzing the introduction of PMG in standard 
experimental duopolies in which subjects compete a la Bertrand (our baseline treatment, 
Treatment I, T-I). PMG is introduced both as a market institution (PMG rules in the 
market, T-II) and as a business strategy (subjects choose whether or not to offer a PMG, 
T-III). Our results show that PMG produce a strong collusive effect in experimental 
markets, even if they are just a strategic alternative. Although complete convergence to 
the collusive equilibrium is only observed in T-II, significant differences relative to our 
baseline also in T-III, in which almost all firms offer a PMG. The remainder of the paper 
is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our theoretical background together with the 
experimental design and procedures. Section 3 analyze the experimental results. Finally, 
section 4 concludes. 
 
2.  Experimental design 
Consider a symmetric Bertrand model extended to the case of differentiated products in 
which two firms (i and j) sell two variants of a product. Demand and profit for firm i in 
round t are given by standard linear functions: 
j i t p p V q γ β + − =       i i t q c p ) ( − = Π      (1) 
where V (autonomous demand), β  (own-price sensitivity), γ  (cross-price sensitivity) and 
unit costs of production  c ci =  are fixed and equal for both firms and follow standard 
restrictions ( β γ ≤ ≤ 0 ); no fixed cost of production are considered. 
In all treatments two firms offer two variants of a differentiated good during 50 
rounds. T-I is just a Bertrand price setting, so subjects unique decision variable was to 
choose a posted price between the unit cost of 30 experimental currency units (ECU), 5 
and 1000 ECU with a 0.1 layout. At the end of each round, subjects received information 
on the performance of their own market in all previous rounds (so they knew previous 
prices, demands and profits). Subjects did not receive information about the subjacent 
demand function in a formal way, although they had qualitative information regarding 
the relationship between prices, demands and profits. In this simultaneous move game, 
the unique equilibrium is the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium (BNE) for differentiated 
products, in which both firms satisfy the usual FOCs6. 
T-II introduces PMG under the form of a market institution as both firms 
simultaneously post prices knowing that a PMG rules in the market and the effective 
selling prices will always equal the minimum posted price. In this case, following Hviid 
                                                           
5 It was not allowed to introduce prices below unit cost to avoid losses. 3 
and Shaffer (1999), a continuum of Nash equilibria arise, as any symmetric price from 
the BNE to the collusive outcome (COL) in which firms maximize their joint profit is an 
equilibrium. 7 Note that in spite of the fact that all these equilibrium are pareto ranked it 
is not clear that the efficient equilibrium will be chosen. But, from the seminal work of 
VHBB (1993), it is far from clear that subjects converge to the efficient equilibrium (the 
collusive one in market experiments), even when equilibria can be pareto ranked. 8 
T-III let subjects decide each round about their posted price and every five rounds 
whether they offer a PMG or not, so in T-III firms played two different games: game A and 
game B.  In game A, simultaneously and independently firms choose a posted price and 
a price policy.  In game B, firms just have to decide about their posted price. This 
structure is not only more realistic (e.g. guarantee choices usually last longer than 
posted price decisions), but provide firms with a convenient learning environment to 
compare different price policies9. Theory says very little in this case, as all symmetric 
equilibria hold and almost infinite asymmetric equilibria emerge in the same price range, 
as it is unilaterally unprofitable for any firm to deviate from a position in which one firm 
offer a PMG and the other is posting a lower price. 
Subjects were randomly paired each round using a stranger matching mechanism 
in order to provide a strong test for the existence of collusive effects.10 Experimental 
subjects were recruited among undergraduate students from Economics and Business 
and had no previous experience in market experiments. Before the beginning of each 
session subjects were given written instructions, the experimenter read aloud the 
instructions and all questions were answered before the experiment began.11 Two 
computerized sessions of 18 subjects and 9 markets were held for each treatment, so 
108 subjects participated. At the end of each session subjects were privately paid in 
cash; a typical session lasted for 60-80 minutes (depending on the experimental 
treatment) and subjects obtained average earnings of about 18 Euros. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
6 Our parameter values (V = 730, β = 1.5, γ  = 0.5 and c = 30) were chosen trying to avoid focal points. With 
this calibration; the BNE was 310 ECU. 
7 COL was obtained if both firms chose a price of 380 ECU. See Hviid ans Shaffer (1999), Proposition 1, for a 
proof of equilibria boundaries. 
8 Broseta, Fatás and Neugebauer (2003) and Croson, Fatás and Neugebauer (2004) are two recent examples 
of this difficulty in experimental games with multiple equilibria. 
9 As in T-I and T-II firms are randomly coupled before each round, very likely subjects will interact every five 
rounds both with subjects that have adopted the guarantee policy and subjects that have not. 
10 As the number of rounds (50) exceeds the number of subjects (18), this mechanism does not prevent 
subjects from being matched with the same opponent more than once along a session, but the relative 
figures keep the frequency rather small. 
11 The translated instructions are available upon request. 4 
 
3.  Experimental Results 
Figure 1 plots the average market prices for every treatment, together with the 
theoretical benchmark (BNE and COL prices). T-I average prices are systematically and 
significantly below BNE12, with a convergence to the non-cooperative equilibrium similar 
to the reported in other experiments.13 Average effective prices per round for every T-II 
session begin between BNE and COL prices, although as the number of rounds 
increases prices converge to the COL. Furthermore, a Wilcoxon test points out that there 
are no differences on average between selling prices and the COL price for the last 
twenty-five periods for both sessions.14 Average profits in the last twenty-five rounds are 
virtually at the COL level (for the last twenty-five rounds profits average 99.63% and 
99.90% of the COL profits in each session). 
In T-III, where subjects not only post prices but choose whether to offer or not a 
price guarantee, observed effective prices are above the competitive ones in both 
sessions and closer to collusive than to Bertrand levels (in the last twenty-five rounds 
average respectively 98.39% and 97.81% of the COL profit, respectively). Subjects 
adopting PMG set posted prices significantly higher than the prices posted by subjects 
not adopting PMG, for the last twenty-five rounds.15  
Figure 1 around here 
  In order to check for the significance of this differences we estimate the following 
model using a random effects panel data estimator16: 
ββ β µ =+ + + 01 2 it PMB PMI it pD D  
where DPMB and DPMI are dummy variable set equal to one for the prices of the sessions 
in which PMG is business strategy and for the prices of the sessions in which PMG is a 
market institution, respectively. By construction, β 0 is the average price when PMG is 
not included in the space of strategies, and β 1 and β 2 are the average variation to this 
price due to the introduction of PMG as business strategy and as business strategy, 
respectively. Table 1 shows that for the last twenty-five rounds the average level of prices 
                                                           
12 Last 25 rounds, Wilcoxon test at the significance level of 5%. 
13 The best known reference in this aspect is probably Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000), and they find the 
Bertrand solution not a too good predictor in duopolies with homogeneous good. García-Gallego and 
Georgantzís (2001) and Fatás and Pallardó (2003) show a similar pattern of behavior in duopolies with 
differentiated goods. 
14 Wilcoxon test, at the 1% level. 
15  Mann–Whitney test, at the 1% level, for both S31 and S32. 
16 
it i t it µ αδε =++, where α i are the individual effects that are considered as random effects, δ t are the time 
effects that are considered as fixed effects and ε it is the error term. 5 
when PMG is a business strategy is 15 units higher than when PMG is not allowed and 
that when PMG is a market institution it is 87 unit higher.  
Table 1 around here 
A panel data regression (for the last twenty-five rounds) of posted prices on a 
dummy variable that takes the value of one (and zero otherwise) if the subject has 
adopted PMG shows that subjects adopting PMG set posted prices that are 67 units 
higher than the prices posted by subjects non adopting PMG17. Table 2 shows the results 
of the regression. 
Table 2 around here 
Table 3 shows the pattern of PM adoption in T-III on average, for every five 
rounds. No less than 70% of the subjects adopt the guarantee for any round in the 
second half of the rounds and more than 90% of the firms adopt it in the last 5 rounds. 
Adopting PMG seems to dominate not adopting PM as profits are significantly higher18 
and subjects realize about that.  
Table 3 around here 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
Although conventional wisdom supports the idea that low price guarantees have a 
competitive effect, we find very little support for this view. Financially motivated subjects 
quickly and easily collude when PMG was implemented as a binding strategy and 
subjects were solely asked to fix a posted price.  This full convergence outcome is 
qualified by at least three design features: subjects were inexperienced, they were 
randomly paired each round (by means of a strangers  matching mechanism) and no 
information was provided about actual demand and supply functions to avoid an explicit 
calculation of joint-profit maximizing outcomes.  These very same subjects were entirely 
unable to reach this collusive outcome in our baseline treatment where no PMG was 
allowed. 
Our paper confers an experimental support to the theoretical analysis initiated by 
Salop's (1986) seminal work that recognizes the anti-competitive effects of price-
matching guarantees. In absence of wider empirical evidence, the experimental analysis 
of PMG guarantees confers antitrust authorities a valuable instrument to discriminate 
between the sellers’ claims of PMG guarantees as instrument favoring competition and 
the academic view of these guarantees as tools facilitating tacit collusion. On the one 
hand, PMG can generate sizeable price effects in markets that parallel many important 
features commonly found in natural markets.  On the other hand, the relevance of this 
                                                           
17 In this panel data regression we also include fixed time effect. 6 
effect may be sensitive to the specific features of the price guarantee, as no full 
convergence to the COL prediction is observed in T-III.  
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Table 1 Average price levels
 Model  1 
β 0  297.466 
(3.536) 
β 1  87.466 
(2.808) 
β 2  15.545 
(2.808) 
R2 0,3806 
All coefficients and differences are significant at 1% level. 
 
Table 2 
 Coefficient Standard  Error
Constant 337.082  15.74 
PMG adoption 67.567  7.087 
All coefficients are significant at 1% level. 
 
 
Table 3: PM Adoption rate 
Rounds 1-5 6-10  11-1516-2021-2526-3031-3536-4041-45 46-50 
T31 81,25  62,5 75  87,5 75  75 68,7593,7581,25  87,5 
T32  37,5  62,5 75 68,75 75  75  75  75 93,75  93,75 
 